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Th1s thes1s represents an 1nvest1gat1on 1nto the mean1ng 
and development of freedom 1n the ph1losophy of Mart1n He1degger. 
Part I deals pr1mar1ly w1th Se1n und Ze1t. , Dase1n, human real----
ity, is defined both as a finite, thrown be1ng-in-the-world 
and as a tree ent1ty, projecting its possibilities. Dasein 
aoh1eves authenticity in the renunoiation ot the orowd and by 
embraoing its ult1mate poss1bility--death. The oonolusion to 
Part I argues tor the ident1 ty, in Heidegger l s though·t, of 
finite freedom and temporality. 
Part II deals with Gelassenhe1t, a work of Heidegger1s 
latter period. Freedom is expressed 1n a new vocabulary. Man 
must release himself but the 1nitiative in the freedom prooess 
is no longer with Dase1n but with Be1ng. The Critique, wh10h 
conoludes the paper, sees the latter Heidegger as an attempt 
to transoend the temporal hor1zon 1mposed by Kant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Martln Heldegger1 was orlglnally motlvated ln phllo-
sophy wlth the read1ng of Franz Brentano's ~ !h! Manni-
~ Sense 2! Belng 1n Aristotle. 2 Thls work polnted 
out the amblgult1es in the Arlstotellan use of the word 
"belng". Heldegger medltated thls book and beoame oon-
vlnoed that the problem of belng must be rethought. Thls 
oonvlotlon lnsplred the wrlttng of hls ohef d'oeuvre, 
Seln und Zeit. J It was to be a reposlng of the questlon ---
about the meanlng of belng. The answer to the belng-
questlon was to be sought ln an analysls of human rea11ty 
(Daseln) oarrled out ln the phenomenologloal tradltlon of 
Husserl, the frlend and teaoher of Heldegger. 
Heldegger's projeo~ed work was to oonsist of two major 
dlvlslons. The Flrst Half was to oontaln (1) a ~oundatlon­
al analysls of Daseln, wlth (2) a defense of the thesls 
that Daseln's meaning was Care, and that (J) any questlon 
about the meanlng of belng must take lnto aooount Temporal-
. 
lty. The Seoond Half was to oontaln an analysls of the 
1 ' 
~ Martln Heldegger was born ln 1898 ln Messklroh, Germany. 
After a brief enoounter wlth -theologloal studies, he be-
gan to pursue phllosophy, eventually oomlng under the 
lnfluenoe of Edmund Husserl at Freiburg. 
Zvon der Mannlgfaohen Bedeutung des Selenden naoh 
ArrstOteies; Frelburg, 1862. --- _ ----
JSeln ~~, Tueblngena N1emeyer, 196J. (abbrevlatedsSZ) 
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phllosophers Kant. Desoartes. and Arlstotle and an ex-
posl tlon of thelr alleged mlsoonoeptl.ons of the be1ng-
questlon. OnlJ the flrst two seotlons of the First Half 
were published. 
Heidegger1s method was the phenomenology of Husserl. 
It professed to be an intuition of essenoes whioh pene-
trated the layers of philosophioal prejudioe to arrive 
at reality,. the phenomenon itself. Truth f or the pheno-
menologlst was the appearance. No metaphysioal theory 
oould substitute for the oareful analysis of what appeared. 
The task of the philosopher was aoourately to lntuit and 
desoribe the phenomenon as lt presented itself ln oon-
soiousness. ~ ~ ~ abounds with phenomenolog1cal 
terminology. Being is said to disolose itself. to oome 
to light. to appear in the l1ght of its presence. etc. 
The difficulty of read1ng Heidegger is legendary. 
4 Even nat1ve German readers have been known to despa1r. 
Heidegger. a gifted linguist. oreates a novel vooabulary 
for the expression of his ldeas. Neologisms abound as do 
revivals of obsolete words and phrases. This ls not 
pedantry; Heideggerbelieves that phenomena are likely to 
stand out in better relief when desor1bed in an unoonven-
tional vocabulary. 
All commentators agree that atter 19;0 Heidegger's 
4ct • Translators Pretaoe to Maoquarie and Robinson verslon 
of Being 2 .'!1!!!.. 
• 
• I 
writings begin to show a new direotion. There is a marked 
ohange, for instanoe, between ~ ~ ~ and the essays 
on Truth and Metaphysios whioh follow after only a few 
years. This ohange effeots both style and oontent. I 
intend to explore the depth of this evolution in Heideggerls 
thought espeoially in 'regard to freedom. 
Freedom is my oentral theme. I propose the following 
two questions for solution in this paper. 
(1) What is the meaning of freedom in Se1n und Zeit? ---
(2) How does the presentation of freedom in Gelassen-
he1tS differ from the above? -
I have ohosen Gelassenheit for two reasons. First, the 
book is ,primarily ooncerned wi th freedom. Seoondly, the 
work is an exoellent example of Heideggerls latter writing. 
The soope of this paper is, then, an investigation 
into the meanin~ and development of freedom with1n the 
ph1losophy ot He1degger. A broader study of the plaoe of 
He1degger 1n the history ot the problem of freedom would 
be of muoh value but beyond my present oonoern. 
The body of the paper w1ll be primarily exposit1ve. 
In Part One my task w1ll ' ',be to isolate the prinoiple ideas 
of Se1n und Ze1t (Dasein and 1ts World, the Ex1stentials, ---
Care, Death, Resolve, and Temporal1ty) and to explore their 
relevanoe for the development of He1degger 1 s understand1ng 
5Gelassenhe1t, Pful11ngenl Neska, 1954. (abbrev1ated. G) 
'-
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of Freedom. In Part Two, I w111 present an expo$1t1on 
of the development of gelassenhe1t.s doctr1ne of freedom 
over that of the early per1od. The oonolusions to Parts 
One and Two will seek to answer the quest10ns proposed . 
earlier in this Introduction bY the defense of two theses. 
The first thesis regards the 1dentifioation of freedom" and 
time in Se1n und Zeit. The seoond has referenoe to the ---
source of freedom in Gelassenheit. 
The final section of the paper will be a Critique of 
Heidegger's thought on freedom. This orit1oal appraisal 
will be carried out (1) by a olarifioation of one way in 
which Heidegger has advanoed over the traditional concept 
of freedom, and (2) by some remarks on Heidegger's over-
ooming ot the temporal horizon imposed bJ Kant. 
PART ONE 
SIIN OND ZEIT 
CHAPTER I 
DASEIN THE FREE 
The concept ot Daseln1 provldes us wlth a profltable 
startlng place for our study of treedom ln Heldegger. 
Llterally Dasein means "to be there". It ls not, as often 
1 
thought, a neologlsm of Heldegger but appears ln phlloso-
phical German with the meaning of presence or exlstence. 
Heldegger's use ls, however, unique. Dasein 1s tor him 
the human phenomenon. 
Dasein ls the ,"there" ot Belng. It is the place 
where Being appears or., to use more Heideggerian language. 
lt is the occaslon for the presence of Being. Heidegger 
sees Dasein as a kind of rupture or break in present-to-
hand reality.2 "Auf dem Grunde des Seinsverstaendnlsses 
1st der Mensch das Da, mit dessen Sein der eroefrnende 
Einbruch in das Selende geschieht •••• " (SZ p. 206) 
This is our first indication of the freedom of Dasein. 
lSeveral excellent translations of Dasein have been offered. 
Perhaps the most llterary is that of de Whaelens: 
"l'existence humaine lt • (f:! Phi~Phie de Martin Heidegger. 
p . 27) Richardson prefers the litera "there-being". 
(Heidegger, p. 44) In this paper I have chosen to retaln 
the German. Moreover, since the term is becoming common 
ln phllosophlcal dlscussions ln Engllsh, I w1l1 omlt the 
underllne. 
2Th1s term refers to that reality which is not Dasein. 
Heidegger derives hls term present-to-hand in hls dis-
cussion ot eqUipment. When a tool fails to function it 
dlscloses itself as merely present-to-hand, 1.e. outside 




It 1s not c1rcumscr1bed by the determ1nlsm whlch character-
1zes present-to-hand reallty. Indeed, 1t ls a rupture ln 
the world ot the present-to-hand which ls an open1ng tor 
the appearance ot Belng. 
B.J namlng man the "there" of Belng Heldegger wlshes to 
convey h1s 1dentlf1cat1on ot Belng (~) and DB-seln. 
There 1s 1n Heldegger no ontologlcal dlstlnctlon between 
the two. The tundamental . ontolog1cal dlfferenoe ls between 
~ ~d Dase1n on the one hand and present-to-hand reallty 
on the other. One of the reasons for Heldegger's deslre to 
avold the ontolog1cal dlstlnct10n between Seln and Daseln ........... 
ls h1s 1ntentlon to overcome the subject-object dlchotomy 
whlch has plagued ph1losophy. In the phllosophy ot 
He1degger one does not f1nd a knownlng subject stand1ng 
vls a v1s an object and the oonsequent problems of un1tlng 
them. He has gone beyond th1s d1st1nct1on and avoided the 
problems lt enta1ls. / 
He1degger understands Dase1n as that entlty whose 
essenoe 1s 1ts ex1stence. It 1s that Belng whose whatness 
(Soseln) 1s lts aot ot ex1stlng (Exlstenz).J The ram1-
floatlons of thls for freedom are tar reaohing. Dase1n's 
essence ls to exlst, to become, to oomplete ltself. It 1s 
lts own poss1b1l1ty of self-aoh1evement. It 1s lncorreot, 
therefore, to thlnk ot Dase1n as a statl0 being, devold 
JIn classlcal med1eval phllosophy ex1stence (esse) was 
attr1buted to only one essenoe, God. 
• 
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of the freedom to develop. It ls on these grounds that 
Heldegger crltlo1zes Arlstotle's deflnltlon of man as 
anthropos logon echon. Man ls, aocordlng to Arlstotle, 
thls thlng or substance to whlch ratlonallty ls added. 
For Heldegger, however, man ls not a substanoe but the 
treedom to become. 
Daher drueckt der Tltel "Dasein", mit dem wir 
dieses Selende· bezeiohnen, nicht sein Was aus, 
wie Tisoh, Haus, Baum, sondern das Seine (SZ, p.42) 
If Daseln accepts the responslblllty of lts freedom 
lt llves authentlcally.4 But lt can also abdicate thls 
responslbll1ty, deny lts freedom and exlst lnauthentl-
cally. Indeed, every Daseln llves much of lts llfe ln 
lnauthentlolty. This ls beoause of lts "everydayness". 
(alltaegllohe Indlfferenz, SZ. p. 43) Daseln ls, as lt 
were, .&uspended between the call to freedom and the 
temptatlon to surrender ltself to the tranqulllzatlon 
of "everydayness". 
In the !2! Wesen ~ .W_a.h_r.h_e_l.t this amblvalence will 
be expressed ln terms of Dasein's dwelling in truth and 
un-truth. t'Das Daseln ist, well wesenhaft verfallend, 
selner Seinsverfassung nach in der Unwahrhelt ..... 5 
4Heidegger's' word for authentioity is Eigenlichkeit. 
Rather than genuineness and similar conoepts thls word 
carries the thrust of the original Greek for authenticlty. 
one's own. I am uniquely myself when I live authenti-
cally. . 




Th1s paper w1ll oooasionally use the term un-freedom. 
Although to my knowledge th1s term does not appear 1n 
He1degger it is a convenient phrase for expressing the 
renunoiation of treedom 1n inauthenticity. For although 
Dasein is called to authentlcity, it oannot live contin-
ually in this state. It is ot the essenoe of Dasein to 
fall 1nto un-freedom. 
One further observation will help to clarify He1degger's 
.understanding of Dasein. We must be caretul to avoid any 
identification of Dasein with the knowing egos of Kant 
and Husserl. Heidegger has attempted to move the realist-
1dealist controversy to another battle ground by positing 
a relationsh1p which is prior to any knower and known ob-
I 
ject. Sinoe there is no ontological distinction between 
Sein and Dasein, there is no need of the type of synthesis ........... 
Kant desoribes in his Transcendental Apperception. 
Moreover Dasein does not relate to its world by form-
ing oonoepts of it. Dasein is basically pre-ontologioal. 
The relationship ot ~ and Dasein takes place before 
conceptualizat1on. Man is aware of Be1ng before there is 
any structural formulation of th1s awareness. This is 
strongly reminiscent ot the Augustin1an-Scotistic tradition 
6 of intUitionism. 
°Heidegger's dissertation tor Habilitation at Freiburg 
was on Duns Scotus. (Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre 
des Duns Scotus, 1915). 
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Heidegger expresses this pre-ontological grasp of 
Being in the phenomenological term "being-in". It is be-
oause of being-in that we can speak of suoh a thing as 
a lumen naturale. 
Die ontisch bildliche Hede Yom lumen naturale 
im Menschen meint nichts anderes als die exist-
enzialontologische Struktur dieses Seienden, 
dass es ist in der Weise, sein DB zu seine Es 
ist "erleuchtet". besagt: an ihm selbst als 
In-der-Welt-sein geliohtet, ••• (SZ, p. 133) 
Being-in will take on more olarity in the next chapter 
as the problem of the world and its relationship to free 
dom is dealt with. 
CHAPTER II 
FREEDOM-THE CONDITION FOR A WORLD 
~h1s chapter w111 1nvest1~t8 the role of freedom 
1n prov1d1ng Dase1n w1th a world. Dase1n 1s 1n 1ts world. 
But th1s 1s not the "1n" of a temporal-spat1al 1nsert1on. 
Nor 1s 1t the "1n" of a conoeptual knowledge ·of the world. 
Dasein knows its world through the intelleotual power whioh 
the Greeks named eidos after an analogy with visual per-
oeption. But th1s. for Heidegger, 1s not the pr1mal re-
lationship. Dase1n's fundamental relat1onsh1p to the world 
1s a pre-oonoeptual awareness which Heidegger oalls be1ng-
in. "Erkennen ist ein Se1nsmodus des Dase1ns als In-der-
Welt-se1n. es hat seine ontische Fundierung in dieser 
Seinsverfassung. (SZ, p. 61) 
The difference between knowing the world, 1n the sense 
of having a oonoept about 1t, 'and the more bas10 exper1ence 
of being-1n oan be descr1bed in terms of tak1ng up a posi-
tion relat1ve to the known object. A seeing (1de1n) 1n-
volves a subjeot-objeot relat10nship and a confrontat1on of 
a thing peroe1ved v1s a vis the peroeptual faoulty. Dase1n 
oan more properly be sa1d -to take part, from the 1ns1de, as 
it were, 1n the entity that 1s understood. Th1s type of 
relationsh1p is poss1ble only in a free being. Dasein is 
not oonstra1ned to • mere "looking at" the world but is 
allowed to parti01pate 1n it. 
, , 
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Heidegger ··distinguishes four usages of the word "wor1d".1 
(1) It oan designate that totality of things present-to-
hand. (2) The world oan be used metaphysically as the 
being of number one. () World oan be used as the wherein 
(worin) Dasein dwells. (4) It can des igna te the me.taphys i-
oal oonoept which corresponds to number three. Heidegger 
will limit his use of the term to the third sense. Dasein 
has its environment (umwelt). But unlike the environment 
of the animal, Dasein's world oonsists in a totality of 
innumerable and interdependent'meaningful relationships. 
Dasein is aware of . these relationships before they are . 
struotured in oonoepts. Each object in the world bears a 
.relationship to many other objeots that pinpoint it in a 
meaningful context. "Zeug ist seiner Zeughaftigkeit e~t­
spreohend immer QUS der Zugehoerigkeit zu anderem Zeug •••• I 
(8Z. p. 68) 
This complex system of identification is indicative 
of the presence of freedom. Dasein combines old meanings 
to form new ones, thereby producing progress in human . 
knowledge. Creativity is the mark of that entity whose 
meaningful world is not statio and determined but free 
lHeidegger's concept of world, although quite original, 
is nevertntsless the outgrowth of::~his association with 
Husser1. The influence of the latter Husserl, espeoia1ly 
the Lebenswelt seotions of the unpublished manuscripts, 
is f e1 t here, as 1·t; is in the wri tings of Me rleau-Ponty • 
(of. dpi~f!)~l~rt!.· , p. lSY. VOJ.. I) 
13 
and dynamio. 
This totality of meaningful relationships which is 
my world only appears when something happens to interrupt 
its smooth funotion. If a hammer were to break down during 
use it would stand out as this thing that no longer fits 
into JlJ7 world. 
In solchem Entdeoken der Unverwendbarkeit 
faellt das Zeug auf. (SZ, p. 73) 
••• es zeigt sich als Zeugding, das so und so 
aussieht und in seiner Zuhandenheit als so 
aussehendes staendig auoh vorhanden war. (SZ, p. 73) 
Die Umsicht stoesst ins Leere und sient erst 
jetzt, wofuer und womit das Fehlende zuhanden 
war. (SZ, . p. 75) 
The upshot of the entire discussion of signs and re-
ferences which comprfses several sections of Chapter III 
of ~ ~ ~ is that besides the objects of our aware-
ness, there is an area in whioh they are enoountered. 
Husserl referred to this as horizon. The horizon is not 
itself a thing of our oonsoiousness but without it the known 
objeot would be impossible. The horizon is eminently free 
in the sense that it lets the .~bjeots of the world stand 
out in their truth, that is to say, it allows them to be 
themselves. 
Dieses, woraufhin umweltlich Zuhandenes freigegeben 
ist, so zwar" dass dieses allererst als inner-
weltliohes Selendes zugaenglioh wird, kann selbst 
nioht als Seiendes dieser entdeokten Seinart be-
griffen werden. (SZ. p. 85) 
14 
The horizon ot understanding has for Heidegger both 
an active and passive aspect. The active aspeot will be 
disoussed when the existential Projeotion is treated. 
(cf. Chapter III) The passive aspeot is the freedom by 
whioh Dasein lets the world appear in its truth. This is 
reminiscent Qf the phenomenologioal method of Husserl who 
constantly enoourages us to return to the things themselves. 
We must avoid prejudioes and unjustified expectations as 
-we investigate phenomena. They must be allowed to be what 
they are. to appear in their original and primal truth. 
It is ln thls sense that we can speak of an openness or 
freedom by whloh Dasein releases the objeot. 
Bewendenlassen bedeutet ontisch: lnnerhalb 
elnes faktisohen Besorgens ein Zuhandenes so 
und so seln lassen, w1e es nunmehr 1st und 
damlt es 80 1st. (SZ, p. 84) 
CHAPTER III 
OASEIN AS FREE ANO FINITE 
In d1soover1ng 1ts world through be1ng-1n. Dase1n 
d1soovers 1tself. ~hese d1soover1es are not 1deas wh10h 
Dase1n forms about itself and 1ts env1ronment but rather 
unstruotured. preontolog10al revelat10ns of ex1stent1al 
s1tuat1ons. In th1s ohapter I w1ll exam1ne the three bas10 
ways 1n wh10h Oase1n 1s 1n 1ts world. He1degger oalls th1s 
Oase1n's ex1stent1al oonst1tut1on. These modes of be1ng-
1n w1ll reveal Dase1n as a f1n1tely tree ent1ty. 
Dase1n's modes of be1ng-1n are not propert1es wh1ch 
Dase1n has but rather fundamental modes of ex1stenoe. 
Dase1n's ex1stenoe then 1s not s1mple but complex. It 
1nvolves a threefold manner of be1ng. But these modes are 
equiprimord1al- ~hey are all on the same level of reality 
and it is the most bas1c one poss1ble. " ••• d1e Charaktere 
sind n10ht Eigensohaften eines Vorhandenen. sondern wesen-
haft ex1stenz1ale We1sen zu Se1n." (SZ. p. 133) 
The f1rst of the three ex1stent1al oonst1tuents of 
Dase1n 1s D1spos1tio~ (Bef1nd11chke1t).1 D1spos1t1on 1s 
Dase1n's d1scovery of itself as already present to a 
ID1SPos1t1on 1s the translat10n of Richardsonz Maoquar1e 
and. Rob1nson translate as "state of m1nd". Etymolog1cally 
betinden means to oons1der or to tind, and reflex1vely 
It oan mean to teel or even to ex1st. I 
. '-.. 
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partioular situatlon. basein is never unattached but 
always dlscloses itself in an attunement with its ·world. 
It is thrown into its environment in the sense that it 
always is as that which has been. Nor is it possible to 
• 
alter or even improve this "has been," o~aracter. Dasein 
is variously determined and discovers itsel~ already. cast 
upon its world. 
In der Ge.s timmthei t is t immer schon s timmungs-
maessig das Daseln als das Seiende ersohlossen, 
dem das Dasein in seinem Sein ueberantwortet 
wurde als dem Seln, das es existierend zu sein 
hat. (SZ, p. 134) 
I 
Heidegger is describing that experience of "just 
being there", the b+ute faot of existenoe. Sartre uses 
the word facticity to express a similar idea. Beflndl1sh-
keit oould well have been the inspiration for Sartre's -
novel ~ Nausee. 
That "I am here" is given in the experlence of Dls-
positlon but the whenoe and whlther is not dlsclosed~ It 
ls thls factor that prompts the use of the word Thrownness 
(Geworfenhei·t) ~ Thls carries connotatlons of the cast of 
the die .· of fate, of belng .thrown on the sea of life, etc. 
Wlth such expresslonsHeldegger portrays the ~ accompll 
character of Dasein. Disposition ·is the exlstential source 
of Dasein's un-freedom. It reveals an entity handed over 
.- to its fate, thrown onto a situation not of its own ohoosing. 
The seoond of Daseln's modes of 
17 
2 belng-in-the-world ls Understandlng (Verstehen). Daseln 
understands lts world. Thls understandlng ls, however, 
nelther an ldea nor judgement about the world. Rather, it 
• 
ls an lmposltlon of meanlngful struotures onto reallty. 
Thls ls termed by Heldegger, Projeotlon (Entwurf). Seelng 
lts posslbll1tles Daseln ohooses among them and lmposes on 
the existlng world lts partloular way of belng ltself. 
Das Verstehen 1st, als Entwerfen, dle Selnsart 
des Daselns, ln der es selne Moegllohkelten als 
Moegllohkelten 1st. (SZ, p. 145) 
Verstehen 1st das exlstenzlale Seln des elgenen 
Selnkoennens des Daseins selbst, so zwar, dass 
dieses Sein an ihm selbst das Woran des mit lhm 
selbst Seins ersohliesst. (SZ, p. 144) 
The important word here ls potentiality-for-belng 
(Seinskoennen). To grasp what Heidegger is saying it must 
be remembered that the definltion of world is that tota11ty 
ot meaningful relationships ,in whloh Daseln finds itself 
involved. The partioular historioal moment in whioh Dasein 
finds ltself is not lts oholoe. It ls determined for Dasein. 
Yet in beoomlDg what it oan, Daseln exeroises its freedom 
by the oholoes lt makes from these innumerable relationships. 
These ohoioes are not the free aots of a faoulty, as in 
the olassioal philosophioal def1nition ot the wlll. But 
rather these oholoes are Dase1n. Dasein does not possess 
a faoulty whioh makes 1t free. Daseln 1s freedom, 1t is its 
posslb1litles. 
/ 2Rl0hardson preters the translation I Comprehens1on. 
4 18 
There is more than just a passing s1milar1ty here 
between the He1degger1an use of the word Projection and 
the Kant1an doctr1ne of the ~ priori. In Kant the pure 
~ priori 1ntuit1ons of space and t1me can be sa1d to be 
projected onto the man1fold of 1ntuition. Moreover, the 
understand1ng th1nks the known object by project1ng onto 
1t the categories wh1ch are ultimately t1me-determinat1ons 
(Ze1tbest1mmungen). He1degger's study of Kant (~~ 
~ Problem ~ MetaPhYsik) wh1ch appeared shortly after · 
Se1n und Zeit, leaves l1ttle doubt as to the 1nfluence ---
of Kant on He1degger. 
However, 1n sp1te of the remarkable s1m1lar1t1es 
between the doctr1nes of Project1on and the Kant1an ~ 
prior1, there are notable d1fferences. He1degger 1s not 
g1v1ng us an .ep1stemology 1n h1s doctr1ne of Projection. 
There 1s no quest10n here of an ~ prior1 1ntu1t1on of 
real1ty. Rather, what Dase1n projeots 1s 1tself, that 1s, 
1ts own un1que way of order1ng and comb1n1ng the myr1ad 
relat1onsh1ps 1t encounters 1n the world. 
The opennes·s to what can become 1s then a d1st1nct1ve 
mark of Dase1n. Th1s 1s why we are able to speak of the 
freedom of Dase1n. Understand1ng accounts for the undeter-
m1ned aspect of Dase1n1 s ex1stence. It 1s always on the 
move, always toward the future. Th1s eventually leads 
He1degger to speak of the Be1ng d1s~losed by the project1ons 
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of Dase1n as Event.) Be1ng 1s the happen1ng or occurrence 
of truth and Dase1n 1s the oooas1on for th1s even't. Be1ng 
~ 
comes to presence when Dase1n projeots 1tself onto the world. 
Th1s 1s no oontrad1ot1on but rather a reo1procal process. 
The freedom wh10h Dase1n exero1ses 1n the projeot1on 
of 1ts pos~1b111t1es and the freedom w1th wh1ch Being be-
oomes present 1s one and the same freedom v1ewed from d1f-
ferent aspeots of the dialeotioal process. The difference 
1s one of emphasis. As a matter of fact we w111 f1nd that 
this placement of emphas1s is the foundation for any d1vi-
sion between an early and a latter Heidegger.4 The earlier 
per10d stresses the. freedom of Dasein in the Event of Be1ng; 
the latter period oonoerns itself more w1th the orig1n of 
th1s Event from beyond Dase1n. 
Because , Dase1n 1s a projeoting ent1ty, 1t is ahead 
of itself. It 11ves 1n such a way that it is always more 
than 1t aotually 1s. Its projects keep 1t, 1n a sense, un-
fulf1lled. 
Auf dem Grunde des Seinsart, die durch das 
Ex1stenzial des Entwurfs konst1tuiert w1rd, 
1st das Dase1n staend1g "mehr" als es tat-
saech11ch ist, wollte man es und koennte 'man 
es als Vorhandenes 1n se1nem Se1nsbestand re-
gistr1eren. (SZ. p. 145) 
j Ereign1s oan mean event or ooourrenoe, that whioh comes to 
pass. Cf. Vortraege und Aufsaetze, Pful11ngen: Neska, 
1954, p. 99. - , 
4 R1ohardson uses the oonven1ent He1degger I and He1degger II. 
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Dasein is doomed to live beyond itselt. It is the "not 
yet aohieved". This is the stigma of freedom. Freedom 
is at once the glory and ourse of Dasein. 
A possible souroe of misunderstanding exists here. 
Dasein's freedom to explore the possible and become it-
self iS1by no means an absolute one. Understanding is 
only one ot the three modes by which Dasein is in its 
world. We have seen that the Thrownness of Dasein has 
limited it to a particular environment, place in time, 
suoh and such faoticity, eto. As a result Dasein's pro-
jeotions will be limited by these situations. In other 
words, Dasein enjoys only a finite freedom. This is in 
marked oontrast to Sartre's pour !2! whose freedom knows 
no bounds. 5 Authentioity tor Dasein involves not only an 
exercise of freedom but also an aoceptance of finitude 
whioh is most olearly telt in the Resolve tor death. (cf. 
Chapter VI) 
Befindlichkeit und Verstehen oharacter1s1eren 
als Ex1stenzialien die urspruengliche Ersch-
lossenheit des In-der-Welt-Seins. 
1 
Der Entwurt des eigensten Seinkoennens 1st 
dem Faotum der Geworfenheit in das Da ueber-
antwortet. (sz, p. 148) 
The final existential mode of being-in 1s Discourse 
(~). Riohardson translates this as Logos and de Whaelens 
as Discursivite. Both of these vers10ns have the advantage 
SCf. art1ole: Transcendenoe !a ~ Philosophy ~ Haidegger, 
Langan, Thomas. The New Soholast101sm, XXXII, 1. ' 
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that they divoroe in our minds the speoif1oally He1degger-
ian mean1ng of ~ from what 1s ord1nar1ly connoted by 
language and talk. D1soourse 1s more gener1c than e1ther 
of these. It may express 1tself in language but 1t 1n-
oludes any art1oulation of Dase1n. And because Disoourse 
ls an eX1stential it 1s the ontolog1cal foundat1on for 
all forms of expresslon, inolud1ng language • . 
Das existenz1al-ontolog1sohe Fundament der 
Spraohe 1st d1e Rede. (SZ, p. 160) 
Rede 1st dle Art1kulat1on der Verstaend11chke1t. 
Die Hlnausgesprochenhe1t der Rede 1st d1e Spraohe 
(SZ, p. 161) 
In the Se1n und Ze1t period of h1s philosophioal ---
development, language does not seem to play the 1mportant 
part ln He1degger's th1nking that lt w1ll later. So much 
of the latter He1degger ·deals with language that 1t takes 
on an almost exclus1ve occupat10n with 1t. He1degger's 
treatment is not a mere analys1s (as 1s prevalent 1n the 
Brit1sh Isles. and Amerlca) but a quasi-poet1cal and at t1mes 
mystioal obsession. One gets the 1mpress1on from some of 
the latter titles that He1degger is a poet rather than a 
professional philosopher. At the same period Heidegger 
.evinces a keen interest in poets, Rilke and Hoelderin for 
instance. Language is raised to a dignity where it seems 
to enjoy a oertain identifioation with Being itself. "Die 
Spraohe ist die Haus des Seins.,,6 
In Sein und Zeit however. Heidegger's awareness ot ---7--
6 Platons Lehre von der wahrheit mit einem brief veber 
den Humanismus, Berna Franoke, 1947. p. 53. 
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the prerogatives of language ls only beginnlng to take 
form. Discourse ls seen as the artioulatlon of lntelllgl-
blllty. It ls the world (total intelliglble relatlonships) 
ln words. Dlsoourse can be thought of and dealt with as 
merely. present-to-hand as in sclentiflc studies of language 
• • 
and ln linguistic analysis. · Philosophloally, however, langu-
age is the expression of the dialeotio of freedom and un-
freedom. It is the ory of a being torn between the tenslon 
created by its summons to freedom on the one hand, and on 
the other, its fall lnto the unfreedom of its everydayness. 
Words can come only from the flnitely free. 
Dle befindllche Verstaendllchkeit des In-der-
Welt-seins spricht sich ala der Bede aus. 
(SZ, p. 161) 
Das Bedeutungsganze der Verstaendllchkelt 
kommt zu Wort. (SZ, p. 161) 
We have seen the three exlstentials by which Daseln 
ls in its world, Disposltlon, Understandlng, and Dlscourse. 
These three are authentio ways of being-ln. To each there 
corresponds an inauthentic manner. The lnauthentic modes 
which Heldegger names are: Amblgulty (Zweldeutlgkelt), 
Curioal~ (Neugier), and Idle Talk (Gerede). Heidegger is 
fond of the term Fallennesa (Verfallenhelt) to descrlbe 
Dase1n's inauthentic state. 
Fallenness, as used in ~ ~~, does not carry 
with it anT theologioal implioations. Authenticity is not 
understood as a state of beatitude from wh10h Dase1n has 
been excluded. On the oontr&r7. Fallenness is as muoh a 
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part of Dasein as authentioity. Dasein fluotuates between 
the two and would be meaningless without either. The ulti-
mate reason for this state of affairs will eventually be 
seen to be the temporal oharaoter of Dasein. 
The inauthentiolty of Fallenness is best seen in the 
rule 'Of the "they".? Through the surrender of its freedom 
Daseln is assiml1ated into the anonymity of the crowd, shar-
ing only the values the orowd diotates. The orowd is no 
one; lt ls everyone. As fallen into inauthenticity, Dasein 
is ln an eminently unfree s ituatl on. One oan recognize the 
oonslderable influence here of Kierkegaard on Beldegger. 
Das Wer ist nicht dleser und nicht jener, 
nicht man selbst und nioht einlge und nicht 
die Summe Aller. Das "Wer" ist das Neutrum. 
das Man. (SZ. p. 126) 
Contemporary technology oontributes more surely to 
this leveling off of the::, indivldual to the status of the 
orowd. But the suooess of the "they" in maintaining thelr 
polnt of vlew is due to the d,isburdenlng effeot of sub-
mission to the "they". After all, individual respons1b1l1ty 
has no plaoe 1n an act that oan be blamed on the group. 
Dasein, by losing itself ln this anonymity, ls really 
a,ttemptlng to abdicate lts personal responslbi11ty. It,' 1s 
fleelng from 1ts burden of freedom. 
Und well das Man mit der Seinsentlastung 
dem jewei11gen Daseln staendlg entgegenkommt, 
behaelt es und verfest1gt es se1ne hartnaeokige 
Herrsohaft. (SZ, p. 128 
!"B!! ~a the orowd, (0';. SZ. p. 126 at seq.) 
CHAPTER IV 
FINITE FREEDOM AS CARE 
Our phenomenologlcal analysls of Daseln has reveal-
ed . a flnltely free exlstenoe whloh dlsoloses ltself ' as 
oonstltuted by Dlsposltlon, Understandlng, and D1soourse. 
Thls ohapter wlll ask whether Daseln can be thought of as 
unlfled and lf so,bow so. In other words, ls there a unlty 
to be found ln the manlfestatlon of Daseln as fln1te free-
dom? It ••• wle est exls tenzlal-olltologlsoh dle Ganzhel t des 
autgezelgten Strukturganzen zu bestlmmen?1I (SZ, p. 181) 
We are lnqulrlng, tberefore, lnto Daseln as a totallty. 
He1degger beglns h1s answer to th1s quest10n by com-
poslng a desor1pt1ve def1nltlon of Daseln, drawn from the 
elements we have already seen. In 1t are contalned all 
the lmportant existent1als. Dase1n 1s ahead of 1tself 
(Understandlng), thrown 1n the world (Dlspos1t1on), and 
alongslde the be1ngs of the world (D1soourse).1 Can the 
meanlng of Dase1n be expressed more suco1notlY? What ls 
the summatlon of the above desor1ptlon? Heldegger rep11es 
that Dase1n 1s care (Sorge) and Care 1s revealed 1n Anxlety 
(Angst) • 
A phenomenology of anxlety ls necessary, therefore, 
lf we are to be able to grasp Daseln as a tota11ty. 
iSlob-vorweg-sO.ho~-seln-ln als seln bel. (SZ, p. 192) 
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Anxiety is the ontological equivalent to the emotion of 
fear. In ~ear, the cause is seen for what 1t 1s, the 
fearsome. In the state of anxiety, however, there 1s an 
experience of being threatened but the source of the dan-
ger remains ve1led. The origin of anxiety is Dase1n as 
~ 
• finite freedom. My f1nitude is the vague yet powerful 
force that · overcomes me with apprehension. As a reaction 
to anxiety Dasein flees. The flight is both from itself 
and its obligation to freedom, Dasein flees to the "they" 
because the crowd takes to itself Dase1n's burden of cho1ce 
'and makes Dasein's dec1sions for 1t. The crowd offers a 
measure of spec10us secur1ty w1th wh1ch Dase1n tranqu1l1zes 
1tself. 
Dei Abkehr des Verfallens gruendet v1elmehr 
1n der Angst, die ihrerseits Furcht erst moe-
glich macht. (8Z, p. 186) 
Das Wovor der Angst 1st das In-der-Welt-se1n 
als solches. (8Z, P. ta6) 
Anx1ety challenges Dasein to 1nqu1re into its world. 
It breaks the spell of the "they" and replaces it w1th 
authent10 dec1s1on mak1ng. Dasein is brought face to face 
w1th its poss1b1lities. The freedom involved in being 
.. open to poss1bles implies a negation. For if I can elect 
this possible, I am free to negate that one. The exper1ence 
of freedom, inasmuch as it: involves the negat10n of un-
chosen poss1b1l1ties, is the souroe of Dase1n's exper1ence 
of Noth1ngness (Nichts) 1n Anx1ety. 
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Die Angst offenbart im Dasein das Sein zum 
eigensten Seinkoennen, das heisst das Freisein 
fuer die Freiheit des Sich-selbst-waehlens und 
-ergreifens. Die Angst bringt das Dasein vor 
sein Freisein fuer... Die Eigenlichkeit seines 
Seins- als Moeglichkeit, die es immer schon ist. 
(SZ, p. 188) 
Existential anxiety thrusts Dasein into an immediate 
encounter w1th the negation at its heart. In ~ ~ 
MetaphySik2 Heidegger again returns to this theme. Nothing 
(Nichts) will then be identified with Being. He1degger re-
calls Hegel's statement: "Pure· Being and pure Nothing are 
thus one and the same. h3 Pure is the decisive word for an 
understanding of this difficult statement. Neither Being 
nor Nothing have oontent. They are the only two perfectly 
pure conoep ts • . 
With this interpretation of Being, Heldegger sets 
himself against the 'olassioal philos'ophical view of Being 
as substance. Being (Sein) is not a being (Seiendes)u -
Being is not an objeot'in our consciousness, rather it is 
the non-substantial source of this consciousness. And it 
1s the revelation of non-be1ng .1n anxiety that is the veil 
of Being. "Das Nichts als das Andere zum Seienden ist der 
Schleier des Seins." (WM, p. 35) 
Anxiety, as the existential experience of non-being, 
d1scloses a Dasein whose meani~is Care. Care is not 
2 ~ ~ Metaphysik, .. 13,~nn: Cohen~ 1930. , Hereafter: WM. 
3 ~ Scienoe ~ Logie, Hegel, I, WW. III, p. 74. 
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understood 1n the ont10 sense of worry over problems but 
as 1nvolvement 1n the world.. As an ent1ty thrown into 1ts 
world, but at the same t1me free to comprehend and arti-
oulate 1ts world, Dasein reveals 1tself as ooncerned w1th 
its world. We are just1f1ed, therefore, 1n speak1ng of the 
mean1ng of Dasein as Care. 
Th1s def1n1t1on of Dase1n 1s more pr1mal than any 
of the def1n1tions 1nsp1red by a present-to-hand analys1s, 
e.g. ,man as a rat10nal an1mal. A def1n1t1on of th1s sort 
1s not incorreot, but 1t m1sleads 1n the sense that 1t 
poses as exhaust1ve. On the oontrary, 1t 1s true as far as 
1t goes but 1t does not reaoh the depths where Dase1n 
dwells. Fundamentally, Dase1n's mean1ng 1s Care. It 1s 
mean1ngfully absorbed 1n and It1ed to 1ts world. 
D1e Sorge le1gt als urspruengl1che Struktur-
ganzheit existenz1al-aprior1sch "vorn jeder, 
das he1sst immer schon 1n jeder fakt1schen 
"Verhaltung" und "Lage" des Dase1ns. (SZ, p. 193) 
The presenoe of an authent10 Care 1ndioates freedom. 
The Dase1n that is most free 1s that wh10h 1s fully aware 
of 1ts 1nvolvement 1n the world 1nto wh1ch 1t 1s thrown 
and wh1ch l1ves 1n an on-go1ng d1alogue w1th the poss1b1l1-
t1es that l1e before 1t. The oppos1te s1tuat1on 1s a mere 
add1ot1on to the worl~ which reduoes the value of Care to 
a m1lder vers10n of w1sh1ng about what could be and wh1ch 
1n rea11ty 1s un-freedom. 
Wenn das Dase1n in e1nem Hang gle10hsam 
vers1nkt, dann 1st n10ht led1gl1oh nooh e1n 
II' 
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Hang vorhanden, sondern d1e volle Struktur 
der Sorge 1st mod1f1z1ert. B11nd geworden, 
maoht es alle Moeg11ohke1ten dam Hang d1enst-
bar. (SZ, p. 195) 
CHAPTER V 
DEATH AS FREELY CHOSEN 
Death is a possible. The fact that we have no evi-
dence of anyone escaping death does not alter its category 
as a possible. But death is not an ordinary possible. It 
is final. Heidegger defines death as the possibility of 
not having any more possibilities e (SZ, p. 262) This chap-
ter will ask how Dasein exercises 1ts f'reedom: in face of 
the possibility of death. 
As long as Dase1n 1s, the're remains something out-
standing, something that remains to be settled. Without 
this settlement, Dase1n is not complete, not achieved. 
But death 1s not a mere end for Dasein but a way of' be1ng. 
An animal has an end, so does a nebula, but Dase1n l1ves 
in such a way that it is always toward 1ts ·end. It is a 
being-toward-death. (~-E!a-~, SZ, p. 234) 
He1degger spends several pages of Sein und Zeit ex----
plicating the unique manner in which death is an end for 
Dasein. Some of his greatest contribut10ns to phenomeno-
logy are made in the chapter on death. Dasein does not 
come to an end like f'ru1t r1pens or the moon reaches 1ts 
complement of' light. The end of death constantly hangs 
over Dasein. It is an ending being. Dase1n l1ves with 
its end; it ex1sts in an ending manner. To bring into 
relief this most important distinction between the dif'tersnt 
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ends, Heidegger prefers to use the word ableben for the 
oessation of the h~an organism. The Dasein which thus 
lives out its time oan be said to perish; only the Dasein 
whioh approaches death authentioally oan be said to die. 
Death affords Dasein with the ultimate possibility 
for expressing its freedom as an individual. My death is 
the most unique thing that I possess. No one can share 
it and oertainly 1t 1s non-transferable. ' Heidegger makes 
the observat1on that death just1f1es h1s earlier identifi-
oat1on of ex1stence and m1neness. Death br1ngs to the fore 
most olearly Dase1n 1s 1nd1v1dua11ty and freedom because it· 
makes Dasein un1que by separat1ng it from the un-freedom 
ot the " they" • 
Ke1ner kann dem Anderen se1n sterben 
abnehmen. (SZ, p. 240) 
Am Sterben zeigt sich, dass der Tod 
ontolog1sch durch' , Jemein1gke1t und 
Existenz konstitulert wird. (SZ, p. 240) 
The temptation to abd1cate my freedom and give my 
death away is strong. The orowd will aocept my death. 
Indeed the anonymity of the "they. is the only way to 
esoape the terror of death. By putting on the personality 
ot the "they" I atta1n 1mmortal1ty. After all, the crowd 
oontinues; only ind1viduals d1e . 
Das Man besorgt ••• eine staendige Beruh1gung , 
ueber den Tod. (SZ. p. 253) 
Das Man laesst den Mut zur Angst vor dem 
Tode n10ht aufkommen. (SZ, p. 254) 
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By resisting the temptation to flee its dea~h Dasein 
finds itself. i.e •• aohieves authentioity. Prima faoie death 
would appear to have no oonneotion with authentioity and 
freedom. If anything strikes us as un-free it is death. 
Yet /by aooepting the finitude intrinsio to its death and 
denying itself the oomfort of the orowd. Dasein frees it-
self for its own authentioity. 
The power of the "they" in tranquilizing us against 
the threat of death takes on its most subtle form in the 
public sayings about the certainty of death. They say, 
for instanoe. that death is unavoidable. Paradoxically. 
what gets oovered up in this lip service to death is pre-
oisely its ~ossibility now* 
Dieser wird hinausgeschoben auf· ein "spaeter 
einmal" und zwar unter Berufung auf das sogen-
annte "allgemeine Ermessen". So verdeokt das 
Man das Eigentuemliohe der Gewissheit des Todes, 
dass er jeden Augenblick moeglich ist. (SZ, p. 258) 
The chapter on death provides a more precise delinea-
tion of Heidegger' ,s dootrine of Projection. We will re-
oall that Dasein's understanding of 1ts world was founded 
on the projection of possibilities onto that world. Free-
dom. as implying the negation of un-chosen possib1lit1es. 
opened to our purv1ew a nothingness. (~Niohts). Now. 
as our picture comes more clear,ly .1;lto foous we see the 
relationship of death to negation. Death announces Dasein's 
intrinsio temporality and finitude. The non-be1ng implied 
in death permeates the existence of Dasein with negation 
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and it is that negation which frees Dasein for its world 
of possibles. Negation is at the heart of every possible 
S".ince each possible is an unactual and, to that extent, 
undetermined and free. 
Das Sein zum Tode ist Vorlaufen in ein 
Seinkoennen des Seienden, dessen Seinsart 
das Vorlaufen selbst ist. 1m vorlaufenden 
Enthuellen dieses Seinkoennens erschliesst 
sich das Dasein ihm selbst hinsichtlich 
seiner aeussersten Moeglichkeit. (SZ, p. 262) 
The key word in the above text is a new one: Anti-
cipation. The actualization of a possible comes about 
through Anticipation. Anticipation is an awaiting by which 
Dasein comports itself toward something possible in its 
possibility. tlZu einem Moeglichen in seiner Moeglichkeit 
verhaelt sich das Dasein jedoch im Erwarten.tI (sz, p. 261) 
BY anticipating the possibility of its own death 
Dasein accepts this possibility and all of its remifica-
tions. In this act Dasein is freed; freed from the domin-
ance of the "they", freed from its own inauthenticity and 
freed from the presence of truth. The n~gation which is 
part and parcel of the revelation of death is the source 
of that openness which is freedom. Without the n1chts there 
could not be freedom because it would be impossible to say 
"no". And he who is free, can either affirm or deny. 
Dasein t S freedom is then a dreadful· ,one • It is purchased 
with the price of finitude. 
The influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger is"of 
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course, quite strong here, as is the influence of Heidegger 
on Bartre. The doctrine of a freedom achieved through a tho-
roughgoing antioipatory aooeptance of death can be interpreted 
either optimistically or pessimistically. Kierkegaard took a 
religious view of the matter and proclaimed it a sickness not 
unto death. Bartre's view was more morbid, in that. it found 
in this situation. something intrinsioally apsurd. It is a 
moot question whether or not Bartre's interpretation of Hei-
degger was correct. ~ ~ ~ does seem to lend itself to 
a reading such as Sartre gave it. On the other hand Heidegger 
has oonsistently disassociated himself from the pessimistio 
school of existentialism as he has from the existentialist 
movement. He has named himself a philosopher of being and 
denied any place for moralizing in his philosoph~. 
However this question may be deoided, one must admit 
that the early Heidegger could easily have been interpreted 
as providing a souroe for a philosophy of absurdity. And 
this is the .reading that influenced Bartre. But as Heidegger 
\ 
himself evolved in his thinking, he beoame more hopeful. 
Man's freedom becomes more than a curse. it is also a source 
of his hope for meaningfulness. 1 
lIn a book of poems written in 1947, Aus der Erfahrung des 
Denkens, Heidegger desoribes us as being in a period or-iait-
ing between the old gods, whioh have left us, and the Advent 
of Being, the apparent new birth. 
Wir kommen fuer die Goetter zu spaet und zu frueh das 
Beyn. Dessen anfangenes Gedioht ist der Mensoh. (ED,p.7) 
Wir sollen niohts tun sondern warten. (G. p. 37) 
We oan appreciate the:i.promise in this if we remember that 
to wait is'clearly to have begun the aotualization of the 
object ot our wait. (BZ, p. 2q2) 
Antlolpatlon, as the full acoeptanoe of death, ~cts 
wlth a shatterlng force on Dasein's oomplacenoy. Dasein 
is tempted to be satisfied with whatever existence it has 
aohieved but the antiolpation of death, by showlng Daseln 
lts f1nal poss1bllity is not-Daseln, destroys lts sense of 
achlevement and drives lt to newer posslbllltles. Heidegger 
quotes Nietszohe to the effeot that Dase1n ls saved from 
"becomlng too old for lts victor1es." (SZ, p. 264) 
It is only through Antlc1pation that Daseln comes into 
possession of the totallty of lts own belng, not that Daseln 
oeases to be ahead-of-ltself but rather that it grasps the 
. . 
imp11cations of its full belng. 
Das Vorlaufen ersohliesst der Existenz als aeus-
serste Moegllohkelt die Selbstaufgabe und zer-
brlcht so jede Versteifung auf die . je erreiohte 
Existenz. Das Dasein behuetet sloh. vorlaufend. 
davor, hlnter slah selbst und · das verstandene 
Seinkoennen zurueckzufallen e • •• (SZ, p. 264) 
I> 
CHAPTER VI 
COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM 
Th1s chapter w1ll deal w1_th He1degger's doc1tr1ne of 
Comm1tment or Resolve (Entschlossenheit). Resolve will be 
seen as Dasein's laying claim to its freedom through an ao-
ceptance of its finitude. The phenomenology of Resolve will 
reveal conscience as a witness to Dasein's potentiality for 
being free. 
Dasein is summoned to authenticity by a witness. The 
witness offers testimony to Dasein's potentiality-for-being-
a-whole. The witness is conscience. At the outset of -his 
phenomenology of conscience Heidegger disavows any of the 
usual theological connotations. Conscience, both in Latin 
and German, is etymologically "that which is knownll • 1 But 
a more profound investigation into this pehnomenon will re-
veal it as a call. The call is always one of gu1lt, and the 
accused is Dasein. 
D1e eindringlichere Analyse des Gewissens 
enthuellt es als Ruf. Der Gewissensruf hat den 
Charakter des Ansrufs des Daseins auf se1n e1gen-
stes Selbstse1nkoennen und das in der Weise des 
Aufrufs zum e1gensten Sohuldigsein. (SZ, p. 209) 
The call is addressed to the self. It therefore passes 
over the "they-self" as insign1f1cant. The call can only 
be heeded by the self. The crowd does not have a conscience 
1 . The German is ~ Gew1ssen. 
\ 
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but only a .vague urge to lnhlblt freedom by reduolng every-
thlng to the same level. In answerlng the oall Daseln 
frees lts oWn self (elgen) and thereby aohleves authentl-
01 ty (Elgentllohkel t) •. 
The oall ls silent. It gives no data or informatlon 
about anythlng. In a sense it oommunloates nothlng. The 
only awareness it delivers over ls the awareness of nothlng-
ness. It ls preoisely the negatlon ln Dasein that ls the 
oall; the negatlon of its Thrownness, ot lts Fallenness. 
Dasein is guilty of being nothing. And lts gullt ls In-
.-..,. 
ourred not by way of a fall from a state of virtue but 
rather by the very faot of its existenoe, Dasein ls gUilt. 
Gle10hwohl liegt 1n der Idee von "sohuld1g" der 
Charakter des Nloht. ••• d1e formal ex1sten-
z1ale Idee des "schuldig" bestimmen w1r daher 
also: Grundsein fuer ein durch ein N1cht best1-
mmtes Se1n- das helsst Grundseln einer Nloht1g- ' 
kel t. (SZ, p .. 283) 
Not only ls Daseln the addressee of the oall of con-
solenoe, it is also the oaller. Consolence ls the summons 
of Dasein from itself to be itself. 1.e. to be all its free-
dom wlll allow. The response to the oall of oonscienoe is 
given by Dasein in its Resolve to be ltself through accept-
anoe of lts nothlngness. Let us investlgate more preoisely 
the nothlngness oontalned ln eaoh of Dasein's exlstentlals. 
As thrown, Daseln ls wlthout a basls (Grund). 
Daseln finds ltself already delivered over to a world not 
of lts ohoutfl.l1g. Moreover, Daseln oan never be sald ~o 
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have a sufficient reason2 for its existence, since, as a 
free being, it is independent of any fundament in the meta-
physioal sense. Its only fundamentum ls nothlngness. 
Es 1st hie existent vor selnem Grunde, sondern 
je nur aus ihm und als dleser. Grundsein besagt 
demnach des eigensten Seins vom Grund auf nle 
maechtlg seln. Dieses Nicht gehoert zum exlst-
enzialen Sinn der Geworfenhelt. (SZ, p. 284) 
As projeoting Dasein can only grasp one of the possl-
'bilities lying before it at any one instance and must there-
by negate all others. This is basic tQ all freedom. The 
choice of one possibility invariably involves the negation 
of others. 
Dle Freihelt aber 1st nur in der Wahl der 
elnen, das heisst in Tragen des Nichtgewaehl-
thabens und Nichtauchwaehlenkoennens der 
anderen. (3Z, p. 285) 
The question of nothingness will be returned to in 
the essay on Metaphysics. (of. H!! ~ Metaphysik, 1930) 
There, after Heidegger has had-the time to meditate the 
significance of the "not", it will appear as indispensable 
for the revelation of Being but at the same time as the 
oause of the hiddenness of Being in metaphysics. Being 
and non-Being are reciprooal parts of the same process, 
the coming to presenoe of truth. The cardinal error of 
metaphysios has been to identify Being with one or more of 
its aspects. Being is beyond the categories or the sum of 
2 In classical metaphysics the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason (Nihil sine Fundamento) sought a substantive origin 
for every existing thing. Dasein is conceived by Heidegger 
as unsubstantial and therefore without suffioient reason. 
,. 
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all of them. Heidegger olaims that Parmenides saw this 
and Plato glimpsed 1t, but with Aristotle a demean1ng of 
Being began. Yet metaphysics is more than an ' ontolog10al 
error. It is a neoessar7 part of the histor7 of ph110sophy. 
The revelations of Being 1n history are always followed by 
a per10d of untruth and error. 
Noth1ng 1s that wh10h makes the revelat10n of 
what-is as such possible for our human ex1stenoe. 
Nothing not merely provides the oonoeptual oppos1te 
for what-is but it 1s also an original part of its 
essence. (WM, p. )40) 
Only beoause Nothing is revealed 1n the very bas1s 
of our Dasein is it possible for the utter strange-
ness of what-is to dawn on us. (WM, p. 347) 
Heidegger has been the cause of much consternat10n 1n 
the philosophioal world with his almost obsessive pre-
oocupat10n with nothingness. He has been aocused of making 
noth1ng in~o something.) Nevertheless ' Heidegger has made 
a good oase for h1s ins1stenoe on the importance of the 
Nichts. It is only through an aooeptanoe of the nothingness 
revealed in the oall of oonsoienoe that Dasein attains its 
freedom and authent10ity. 
This aooeptanoe by Dasein of 1tself in all the 1mp11-
oat10ns of 1ts non-being 1s named Resolution (Entsohlossen-
~)8 The hearing (hoeren) of the call of guilt brings 
Dasein to realize its loss in'""'the "they" and makes Dase1n 
JHeidegger's 1nquiry into the ontological essence of 
nothing ( ••• ontolog1schen Wesen des Nioht ueberhaupt ••• 
SZ, p. 285) was the oooasion for numerous philosophioal 
jests. 
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subm1ss1ve (hoer1g) to 1ts full potent1a11ty-for-be1ng. 
See1ng 1ts f1n1tude and the negat10n at 1ts essenoe, Dase1n 
projeots upon this negat10n through a oomm1tment to be 1t-
self. Dase1n thus frees 1tself to beoome what 1t oan. 
D1e Gew1sshe1t des Entschlusses bedeutet: 
S1chfreihalten fuer seine moegliche und je · 
factisch notwendige Zurueoknahme. Im. Gegen-
!~ teil: dieses Fuer-wahr-halten als entschlos-
senes S1oh-frei-halten fuer die Zuruecknahme 
1st d1e elgentllohe Entsohlossenhelt zur W1e-





TEMPORALITY AS FINITE FREEDOM 
Dasein has revealed itself as .a thrown, projecting, 
fallen being-in-the-world. This finitely free existence 
has been summarily expressed as Care. Our next task w1ll 
be to inqu1re into the meaning of Care. Wha~ is the justi-
fication for our use of such a term? Is there a more pro-
found 1ns1ght still to be had, which will shed fuller 
light on Dasein as Care? Heidegger answers affirmatively, 
and responds that ~emporality (Zeitlichkeit) 1s the mean1ng 
of Care. This ohapter w1ll seek an understand1ng of Tem-
porality, and an explanation of its relat10nship to free-
dom. 
'Tempora11ty 1s not time. W1th the word "time ll we 
invar1ably associate ' images of oalendars and olocks, time 
loans, time capsules, and so forth. These indicate the 
durational and successional aspects of t1me. Heidegger, 
however, sees the above concept10ns of time as inadequate. 
Indeed, he ins1sts that the phenomenon of t1me has never 
been correctly understood in the h1stQry Qf western ph1lo-
sophy. 
For He1degger, Temporality is the foundat1on for all 
other 1mages of time. Anyth1ng that has or can be said about 








~t bestimm~en of ~ant, derlves from the prlmal faot 
of Daseln t s , temporality. Let us recall each of Daseln's 
exlstentlals and explore thelr temporal content. 
As free, Daseln is oonstantly comlng toward ltself 
and its posslbillties; lt ls a not-yet-achleved entlty, al-
ways projeotlng ltself. It ls for thls reason tha~ we can 
speak of a future. Daseln does not plan ahead beoause there ' 
ls a future, there ls a future because Daseln ls a free, 
projectlng belng-ln-the-world. 
Das dle ausgezelchnete Moegllohkelt aushaltende, 
ln lhr slch auf slch Zukommen-lassen 1st das ur-
spruengllohe Phaenomen 'der Zukunft. (SZ, p. 325) 
••• das Vorlaufen selbst nur moeglloh 1st, sofern 
das Daseln als selendes ueberhaupt schon lmmer auf 
slch zukommt, das helsst ln selnem Seln ueber-
haupt z~enftig 1st. (SZ, p. 325) 
As thnown, Daseln 15 determlned. Only from the basls 
of the un-freedom of Thrownness ls lt posslble for Daseln 
to resolve. It ls due to the determlnant of Daseln t s 
Thrownness that we oan speak of a past~ AJ3 thrown, Daseln 
ls that entlty whlch has a past, and it is preoisely the 
limlt-situatlon lmposed by the past that inhibits Dasein's 
freedom. 
Dle Uebernahme der Geworfenheit ist aber nur so 
moeglich, dass das zukuenftige Dasein sein elgen-
stes "wie es je shon war". das heisst sein IfGwesen" 
seln kann. (SZ, p. 326) 
The entire prooess by which Dasein embraces the 
nullity of its Thrownness and frees itself from the ttthey" 
in the projeotion of authentio possibilities produoes what 
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we oall the "present". Daseln ls, therefore, baslcally 
temporal. And tlme, as Heldegger understands lt, dlsoloses 
itself as the ultimate meaning of Daseln. From this it 
follows that the Platonl0 attempt to see beyond the world 
of the temporal to a non-temporal origin is futlle. In 
thls Heldegger shows himself to be profoundly Kantian. 
Time is Dasein's horizon, 1.e. there is for Dasein no 
vision of anything beyond the temporal. It is for this 
reason that Heidegger will be able to say that the question 
of Being whiph initially motivated his philosophical quest 
is ultimately a question about the mystery of time. 1 w~ 
are now ln a positlon to understand what Heldegger intended 
when he entitled Part One of ~ ~ ~l "The Interpre-
tation of Dasein as Temporality and the Demonstratlon of 
Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of 
Being. ,,2 
The temporal horlzon is the oondltion for the possi-
bility of such an entity as Dasein. Heldegger refers to 
Dasein as an eostatio belng, literally, it is outside of 
itself. (Greek: ~ stasein) T~e transoendental Dasein ' 
lCf. Q!! Gegenwart ~ Philosophle, Rombach, H., Chapter 
". XI I Zei t und Sein 
2Transoendental in Heldegger's sense (as in Kant's) means 
~ priorl and universal. The Heidegger of ~ ~ ~ 
denies the transcendent, i.e, that there is anything in 
our -experience beyond time's horizon, 
• 
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has orossed over the l1m1tat1ons of 1ts Thrownness to the 
I 
freedom of 1ts poss1b1l1t1es. As such, Dase1n 1s 1n ecstasy. 
D1e ekstat1sche E1nhe1t der Ze1t11chke1t, das 
he1sst d1e E1nhe1t des "ausser-s1ch" 1n den 
Entrueckungen von Zukunft, Gewesenhe1t, und 
Gegenwart. 1st d1e Bed1ngung der Moeg11chke1t 
dafuer, dass e1n Se1endes se1n kann, das als 
se1n ' ttDan exist1ert. (SZ, pO. 350) 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
My study of Se1n und Zeit leads me to conclude that ---
there is no essential difference in He1degger l s understand-
ing ot treedom and temporality. A complete understanding 
of freedom in He1degger inoludes not only the capao1ty for 
the projection of possibilities but also the determinant 
of Thrownness. Un-freedom is, therefore, part of the 
essenoe of freedom just as un-truth or error is of the 
essenoe of truth. ,( Cf. WW, Chapter VI) 
Dase1n is what it oan become. That is, it 1s defined 
in terms of its possibilities. As an entity ahead of it-
self, 1t d1reots 1ts development by projecting the innumer-
able alternatives open to it. But the negation whioh lies 
in every affirmat10n ot Dasein1s possib1lit1es (the affir-
mation of one poss1ble oloses off other ohoices) introduoes 
a limit to freedom. As negating, Dase1n is thrown and 
fallen. Freiedom for He1degger .1s, then, essentially f1ni te. 
\ 
To aot freely means to aot in a l1m1t-s1tuat1on. No free-
dom 1s without its un-freedom. 
Our thes1s is that freedom so understood is 1dentical 
with temporality. The two are complimentary aspeots of the 
same prooess; they are different articulations of the same 
phenomenon. Sein und Zeit is olear that the reason· we oan ---
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speak of a future, the very reason for the ex1stence of 
calendar and clock t1me 1s Dase1n 1 s freedom to projeot 1ts 
posslbllitles. The future ls Daseln as posslbll1ty. 
Thls ls, however, not the total phenomenon. For 
every projectlon lnvolves a llmitat1on. The llmlt 1s the 
past lnto whlch Daseln is thrown; that whlch oannot be 
ohosen. Thls statl0, determinant aspect of Daseln1 s exlst-
enoe ls essentlally lnvolved ln every thrust toward the 
future. Man llves suspended, as lt were, between the t wo , 
and thls ls the meaning of temporality. Tlme is the name 
we give the experience ot existing at the ohiasma between 




RELEASED FOR FREEDOM 
........ 
Gelassenhe1t represents the mature Heidegger 1n the 
, 
treatment of the problem of freedom. 1 The d1alogue ,form 
is used. The latter writings of Heidegger show a prefer-
ence for less formal and more l1terary forms of expression 
for phllos9phlcal ideas. Thus the. treatises and d1sserta-
tions of the early years are dlscarded for the essays, 
dlalogues, and even poems of the latter period. Gelassen-
~ ls set on a country walk wlth a teaoher, scholar ~ 
solentlst as part1c1pants. Thls chapter w1ll deal wlth 
Gelassenhe1t's oontrlbutlons to the freedom-questlon. 
The d1alogue beg1ns wlth the observatlon that for 
Kant thlnklng was spontaneity and therefore a type of 
wlll1ng. Heldegger, who plays the role 1n the dialogue 
of the teacher, paradox1callY ,asserts that lf we 4re to 
disoover the nature of th1s wllling we must look away from 
it; that ls, we must f1rst grasp what un-w1lling ls. 
Heldegger ls attempting to dlsabuse us of the tradltlonal 
.14ea of freedom (the ac t of the faculty of the will) ln 
preparatlon for hls understand1ng of freedom. 
lAlthough the pub11catlon date of Gelassenhelt 1s 1959, 
Heidegger tells us in a footnote that the dialogue was 





Thls un-wllllng ls a preparatory step for Release-
Sle wollen eln Nlcht-Wollen 1m Slnne der 
Absage an das Wollen, damlt wir uns durch 
dleses hlndurch auf das gesuchte Wesen des 
Denkens, das nicht eln Wollen ist, einlasaen 
koennen oder una wenlgstens hlerzu berelt-
machen. (G, p. 33) 
The termlnus ~ guo of thls Releasement ls willing in the 
tradltlonal sense of the operatlon of a faculty. The 
terminus ~ guem ls the essence of willlng whioh Heldegger 
ls seeklng and attempting to name. The entlre prooess ls 
begun by an ao t of renuncla tl on- (Absage). 
It ls noteworthy that Heidegger evlnoes some am-
b1gu1ty 1n deal1ng w1th the relat1onsh1p between Release-
ment and the renouncement of w1ll1ng. At f1rst he tells us 
that the former 1s produced by the latter. Then, as 1f 1n 
an attempt for prec1s1on, he states that un-w1ll1ng only 
prepares us ror Releasement. Thls 1ndec1s1on takes on 
1mportance when lt ls remembered that 1n the early Heidegger 
the emphasls 1n the revelation of Belng ls no 19nger g1ven 
to Dase1n but to Be1ng 1tself. Daseln s1mply prepares 
1tself for Be1ng. 
That Releasement is effeoted from beyond the nature 
2The word Gelassenheit deserves some attention. The root 
lassen means to let appear, to look, to leave alone, to 
allow. Gelassenheit means ord1nar1ly patience, self-
possession, even resignation. The context seems to ind1-
cate that Heidegger intends the word in some sense of 
udetaohing oneself and handing oneself over for somethlng". 
I have ohosen "Releasement" as a translatlon. 
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of man is explicitly stated by the scientist: "Die 
Gelassenheit wird also anderswoher bewirkt." (G, p. ,)4) 
We are not ourselves responsible for the awakening of this 
release. On the' other hand, however, it is no effete 
-
passivity in the sense of letting things happen. The Re-
leasement of whioh Heidegger speaks is beyond our oonoepts 
of aotivity and .paSsivity. (of. G. p. 36) 
To summarize what we have seen thus far one can speak 
of two Releasements. First, Dasein frees itself from the 
traditional sense of ~illing (much in the same way that 
Dasein freed itself from the "they" in ~ ~ ~) 
and holds itself in preparation for a second Releasement 
whioh is effeoted from beyond Dasein. 
Several highly poetio sentenoes are inserted in the 
dialogue to the effect that the conversation succeeds be-
cause of a oalm which arrives with the approach of evening. 
-......... 
There is also a referenoe to a mysterious guiding hand which 
is given credit for direoting the dialogue. 
Immer geloester vertraue ich dem unsoheinbaren 
Geleit, das uns in diesem Gespraech an die Hand, 
oder richtiger gesagt, beim Wort nimwt. (G, p. 34) 
Many interpretBtions of the symbolism of the approaching 
night and gUiding-' ,hand could be offered but since I hesi-
tate to indulge in the conjeotural, let me be content with 
taking note of the profoundly poetioal turn of the latter 
Heldegger. 
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In his efforts to explore the freedom of Release-
ment Heidegger ·makes one of his rare acknowledgements of 
indebtedness to Meister Eckhart. Although this 13th century 
founder of German mysticism was still in the metaphysical 
tradition because of his attempts to think Releasement in 
terms of the will, nevertheless he did at least glimpse the 
problem and ·from him much is to be learned. Still, the pro-
blem is n~t a theologioal one, as Heidegger sees it. We 
must avoid all thoughts of Releasement as a disoipline of 
self in favor of . the divine will. 
Our task is to think the mystery of freedom which we 
have called Releasement. Suooess is impossible if we expeot 
that thought must be representational. The nature of freedom 
whioh we are pursuing and trying to name does not admit of 
oonceptualization. ~ image we might attempt will only 
serve to oloud the issue. The scientist and scholar find 
this profoundly disturbing. The teaoher suggests the only 
solution is to wait. "Wir sollen nichts tun sondern warten." 
(G. Q2) ": It should be remembered that waiting played an 
important part in the freedom-doctrine of ~ ~ ~. 
Waiting was a integral part of Projeotion by which Dasein 
opened itself to the horizon of possibilities and held 
itself in preparation for thel~aotualization. (SZ. p. 262) 
It will be recalled that horizon played an 1mportant 
part 1n the early Be1degger. By way of a v1sual analogy, 
the f1eld of vision would be to the peroe1ved objeot as the 
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horizon would be to the known object. What is central is 
the insight that the horizon is not another objeot of ex-
perience, rather it is that which permits the objeots to 
be enoountered. 3 Now, in Gelassenheit. we find the doo-
trine of horizon expanded and g1ven a new name, the Region 
(Gegnet).4 
The f1rst oharaoteristic of the Reg10n 1s 1ts open-
ness. 
Wir sagen, dass w1r in den Horizont hineinsehen. 
Der Gesiohtskreis 1st also ein Offenes, welche 
Offenheit ihm nioht dadurch zukommt, dass w1r 
h1ne1nsehen. (g, p. 39) 
The Reg10n 1s open · because it does not oonstrain the ob-
jects of exper1ence but allows them to be what they are. 
He1degger expresses this 1n terms of letting things rest, 
shelter1ng them, proteot1ng them in the1r manifestat1on. 
The th1ngs of exper1enoe are g1ven the freedom to be them-
selves. 
FABER wo ruhen die Dinge, und worin besteht 
das Ruhen? 
L S1e ruhen in der Rueckkehr zur Weile der 
Weite ihres Sichgehoerens. 
J By way of tangential comment, one is reminded at this 
point that Heidegger develops a criticism of traditional 
metaphysical god-theories from his doctrine of horizon. 
God, aooording to Heidegger, could -never be another Bains 
among beings, albeit a super-being. (The Ontho~theo­
logical Nature of Metaphysics, in Identitaet und D1fferenz, 
Phhll1ngen: Neska, 1957) -
4 Gegnet is South German dialeot for Gegend. 
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G Kann denn in der Rueokkehr, die dooh 
Bewegung ist, eine Ruhe sein? 
L Gar wohl, falls die Ruhe der Herd und 
das Walten aller Bewegung ist. CG, p. 4) 
Heidegger makes no effort to minimize the paradoxes 
involved in some of his statements. The return, for in-
stanoe, of the objeot would seem to suggest a motlon. Yet, 
the objeot is sald to be at rest and to abide in the free 
area whioh is the Expanse of Openness. 
The free Region oan not be thought conceptually, that 
would reify it and thereby destroy its freedom. The Region 
is free precisely because it does not have the determination 
of a thing in experience. Man can, however, dispose hlm-
self for the appearance of the Region by renouncing all re-
presentational endeavors. Heidegger calls for a type of 
self-discipline by whioh we put behind us all attempts to 
oonceptualize the Region and wait attentively for what must 
qom~ ultimately from beyond us. This is typical of the 
latter Baidegger. Ossein is no longer the source of the 
Openness but rather the freedom of the open Region is be-
stowed from a source whioh is veiled and beyond the power 
of Dasein to control. 
The free Region ocours; it is a process. Besides the 
noun Gegnet He1degger also uses gegnen,5 to oppose or to 
region. The Region is not static but in aot. Indeed, it 
SAgain. this verb is found only in South. German dialeo:ts, 
the araa of Heidegger's birth. 
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enjoys greae autonomy. It is said to present itself subtly 
to the d1alQgue w1thout the knowledge of the partic1pants. 
Moreover. it is answerable only to itself. Man's task is 
to bow to the autonomy of the Reg10n by remov1ng the ob-
struct10ns which an objectifying thinking plaoes in the way 
of the freedom of the Region. 
So powerful is the domain of the Reg10n that it lays 
olaim to man. It assimilates him as if he were property. 
Heidegger uses the word "appropr1ates" (geeignet) to de-
scr1be the possession of Dasein . by the Region. The Region 
takes Dase1n tor its own and thereby makes it authentic 
(eigenlich). One is naturally reminded here of Hegel's . 
theory of freedom, in whioh man is truly free only when 
. . 
submitting to the Absolute. (of. He 1degger , Riohardson, 
331 et seq.) 
The appropriation of Dasein by the Reg10n is not 
permanent. As soon as man is claimed by the Region, he is 
already being lost to it. This restless back and forth 
between the freedom of a Releasement to the Reg10n and the 
forgetfulness of freedom 1n inauthenticity is the fate 
of Dasein. Heidegger speaks of a suspension between the 
yes and no, between Being and non-Being. (G, p. 53) This 
clearly indicates, although in a more poetio manner than 
the early works, the finitude of man's releasement. How-
ever, Gelassenheit does give evidenoe of an attempt by 
Heidegger to transcend the dialectio of treedom and un-freedom 
1n wh1ch man 1s 1mpr1soned and seek a source outside of the 
d1aleot1cal prooess. Th1s source would be the or1gin of 
our exper1ence of freedom. Heidegger suggests the name: 
Region1ng. 
G ••• 1st 'd1e Bez1ehung der Gegnet zur Gelassen-
hait wader ain kausaler W1rkungszusammenhang. 
noch das hor1zontal-transzendentale Verhaeltn1s • 
••• due Bez1ehung ••• kann weder als ontische noch 
als1 ontologisohe gedaoht werden ••• 
L sondern nur als Vergegnis. (0, p. 55) 
It is not easy to exaggerate the importance of this · 
step 1n He1degger's think1ng. In the early He1degger 
Dase1n was the source of the freedom whioh made man authen-
t1c; 1n the latter He1degger th1s freedom oomes from out-
-
s1de Dase1n. The paradox1cal result 1s that we must seek 
the nature of man outs1de of man, 1.e., from the Reg10n of 
Openness. 
L Nur 1nsofern das Wesen des Menschen nicht aus 
dem Menschen sein Gepraege erfaehrt, sondern 
aus dem. was wir d1e G~gnet und ihre Vergegnis 
nennen, ereignet sioh die von Ihnen geahnte 
Geschichte als die Gesoh1ohte der Gegnet. 
(G. p. 58) 
The Region 1s responsible for man's history. H1story 
is not so muoh oreated by man as it is directed from the 
Reg1on. Directed but not diotated. The Region does not 
foroe itself upon man in the sense that man loses his free-
dom. But not that freedGm is oonoeived as originating 
primarily 'with the Region, mants part becomes increasingly 
passive. He is to prepare himself by a recept1ve waiting 
for the d1reot1ons of the Region. 
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'Das Ges1ch1cht11che beruht 1n der Gegnet 'und 
1n dem, was s1ch als d1e Gegnet ere1gnet, d1e, 
dem Menschen s1ch zuschickend, ihn 1n sein 
Wesen vergegnet. (G, p. 59) 
Die also verhalten ausdauernde Gelassenheit 
waere die Empfaengnis der Vergegnis der Gegnet. 
(G, p. 61) 
He1degger exp11c1tly states the continuity of this thought 
with the dootrine of Resolve 1n Sein ~~. Thus the 
freedom whereby man oommits himself to his finitude 1s an 
aspeot of the freedom of the Region. 
Man muesste dann z.B. das wort "Entsohlossenhe1t" 
so denken, wie es in "Sein und Zeit" gedacht 1st: 
als das eigens uebernommen'e S1choeffnen des 
Dase1ns fuer das Offene ••• (G, p. 61) 
CHAPTER II 
CONCLUSION 
A reading of Heidegger will disolose an evolution in 
his thought. The first thing that strikes the reader is that 
the early works tend to be lengthy and teohnioal, while the 
latter are shorter and poetioal. But behind this stylistio 
differenoe there lies a more profound and momentous ohange. 
S9me of Heidegger's oommentators have referred to this as 
a reversal. Some (e.g. Riohardson) would seem to suggest 
that there are really two He1deggers .. , as if one were deal-
ing with not one but two suooessive philosophers. There 
is perhaps a danger of exaggerating the differenoe between 
the early and latter Heideggers. Nothing 1n the latter 
Heidegger refutes the early Heidegger. Aotually, the more 
one reads the entire oorpus, the more one beoomes oonvinoed 
of a remarkable oontinuity. 
Nevertheless, there is solid ground for making a dis-
tinotion between the Heidegger of Se1n und Zeit and the ---
........ 
Heidegger of those writings published after 1930. The dif-
ferenoe is not so muoh one of dootrine but one of emphas1s. 
, "Heidegger begins with the being-question as his problematio. 
The monument of ~ ~ ~ approaohes this problem from 
the point of v1ew of a phenomenologioal analysis of Dasein. 
The analysis is largely suooessful; so suooessful, in faot, 
that one gets the impression that the being-question begins , 
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and ends with Dasein. As the oreator of freedom, Dasein is 
the oynosure of attention. Yet, 1n the m1dst of this pre-
oooupation with the_prerogatives of Dase1n, there is still 
the unanswered question as to the source of time and freedom. 
~ ~ ~ oloses with this quest10n st11l unanswered. 
(SZ. p. 437) 
With the development of his thought in Gelassenheit 
Heidegger 1ncreas1ngly sh1fts emphas1s from the prerogatives 
of Dasein to a source of rreedom beyond man. Heidegger 
th1nks less about the part of Dase1n in projecting a free 
world, and more about freedom and un-freedom as a d1alect1c 
• 1 
from wh10h the freedom of Dasein or1ginates. The s1tuat1on 
1s analogous to that of the evolut10n from the theology of 
the M1ddle Ages to the anthropology of the Renaissanoe. 
In He1degger (although I do not w1sh to suggest the oon-
struotion or a theology, str10tly speaking, by Heidegger) 
there 1s an evolut1on from the anthropolog1cally or1ented 
days of Se1n und Ze1t to the transcendent or1entatiQn of ---
the latter .. -per1od. 
• 
CRITIQUE 
I offer now. by way of or1t1oal appraisal. some re-
' marks on the s1gn1fioance of He1degger 1 s dootr1ne of free-
dom. F1rst. I hope to prov1de a deeper 1ns1ght into the 
revolut10nary aspeot of ~ ~ Ze1t·s understand1ng of 
freedom. Seoondly, I w1ll demonstrate the 1mportance of 
I 
Gelassenhe1t to be based on 1ts overoom1ng of the Kant1an 
temporal hor1zon. 
(1) Trad1t10nally, ph1losophy has tended to look 
upon freedom as the act of a faculty. An analogy was oon-
struoted between the 1ntellect and the w1ll. Just as the 
soul was thought to possess a faoulty. the intelleot, which 
produoed aots of understand1ng and had for 1ts object 1deas, 
so too the w1ll was conce1ved as a faoulty whioh produoed 
aots of freedom. The true was the objeot of the 1ntellect 
and the good the objeot of the w1ll. 
Heidegger's understanding of freedom stands in marked 
contrast to th1s faoultat1ve theory. Freedom 1s not an aot 
of Dasein- the aot of freedom 1s Dase1n. There 1s much 
here that is revolut10nary. He1degger 1s rejecting all 
ph1losoph1es which see Dase1n as a substance to wh1ch cer-
tain powers (rationa11ty, vo11t10n) have been added, For 
He1degger, Dase1n 1s poss1bi11ty, development. process. It 
1s what it can become. Freedom 1s the fundamental datum 
wh10h a phenomenology of Dase1n produoes, and whatever else 
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can be said of Dasein oan only be said beoause of 1ts 
freedom. Even Dasein's understanding of its world is pre-
dicated upon its freedom. 
With this doctrine Heidegger ciroumvents two of the 
most treacherous problems the history of philosophy has 
encountered in dea11ng with freedom. First . the faculta-
tive theory of freedom had to explain the contradiotion 
between the necessity of a free' act ' being uncaused and the 
problem of conceiving a faoulty. albiet the will, which 
oould produce .aots which were unoaused. The by-passing 
of the entire question of a faoultative freedom has spared 
Heidegger the agony of oonstruoting a faoulty whioh aoted 
without effeots. 
Seoondly.muoh energy 1n the history of philosophy 
has been expended 1n the attempt to reoonoile the freedom 
of God with the freedom of man. The medieval controvers1es 
over predestination w1tness this. Moreover. this problem 
reours in the philosophy of Hegal, who finally oonoludes 
that man must submit to the freedom of the Absolute to find 
his own freedom. With Heid~gger this submission 1s un-
necessary. Sinoe there is no distinotion between Sein 
. and Dase1n. there oan never be a confliot between them. 
If freedom ' s or1gin is beyond man. as I have tried to de-
monstrate is the oase in the early Heidegger v this does not 
allow one to oonalude that Dasein is subordinated to the ' 
souroe ' of freedom. The freedom of Being is one and the 
60 
same w1th the freedom of Dase1n. 
It must never be forgotten that the freedom of 
Dase1n 1s a 11m1ted one. Dase1n 1s an on-go1ng ent1ty, but 
th1s does nat m1t1gate 1ts rad1cal 1mmers1on in the world 
of everyday ,petty conoerns and 1nauthentic distractions. 
Dase1n 1s fin1te freedom. To be free means to be a part · 
of the temporal process and th1s 1n turn means to experienoe 
the tens10n of one's l1m1tat1ons 1n the cont1nuing search 
for real1zat1on. 
(2) Although Heidegger's theory of freedom avoids the 
problems of a faoultative theory and those of a ph1losophy 
which would see a oonfl1ot between ~ and Dasein, it must 
be adm1tted that the .freedom-dootrine of Heiqegger creates 
a ser10us d1ff1culty. There 1s· a ~emptat1on to conclude 
from the read1ng of the early He1degger that manls ex1stence 
1s an absurd one. The faot that man 1s defined as the pro-
cess of freedom, leaves man w1thout a plaoe of rest. All 
1s development and movement, seemingly w1thout any f1nal 
ach1evement. For a final1ty 1n the process of freedom 
would destroy Dasein and replaoe it w1th the statio exist-
enoe of a present-to-hand ent~ty . 
The result of Heidegger~s doctrine of freedom 1s a 
world without absolutes. For, .by definition , an absolute 
1s released from determ1nat1on. It is absolved . In the 
early He1degger, however. t1me was the hor1zon or all ex-
per1enoe and noth1ng oould be oonce1ved that did not l1e 
\ 
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under its pall. Man was, in the philosophy of the early 
Heidegger, a voyager who never saw port and whose only 
consolation was the satisfaction that might be gained by 
solving the problems of his journey as they arose. There 
could never be any respite to look forward to, no harbor 
to reach. Man's fate was that of Sisyphus. 
It 1s 1n the light of th1s perplex1ty that we must 
seek the importance of Gelas~ef).hei t. I propose that- the 
significance of Gelassenheit lies in its attempt to see 
beyond the K~tian temporal horizon. 
For Kant, every perception was informed by the in-
tuition of time before being submitted to our understanding. 
As a result., reason was placed under the aegis of time. 
Time became . the supreme judge to which all human experience 
was subject. Although it is true that Kant sought contact 
with the transcendent through the imperatives of the will. 
still, time hung as a cloud over all man's endeavors. No 
thought of an absolute was possible, Since, by definition, 
an absolute would be absolved from ail determinations (in' 
this case) of time. So mUQh of , con~emporary philosophy 
has lived under this curse. Man is seen as a creature with 
'infini te aspirations yet finite sbili ties. He can hope 
limitlessly yet perform only finitely. 
Gelassenheit has attempted to :break out of Kant's 
temporal prison. It seeks a source for the temporal pro-
cess itself. And although this source 1s not named, because 
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the point in .history has not arrived when it oan be named, 
still Heidegger speaks of it in terms that .suggest its free-
dom from the determinations of time. Thus, it is oalled the 
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